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No One Statute Should Have Too Much
Power: How Electing Not to Amend 42
U.S.C § 1320(a)–7(b) May Frustrate the
Purpose of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act
Amber C. Dawson*
The over breadth of the Federal Anti-Kickback statute as amended
by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) holds
dangerous implications for the future of the health care
marketplace. When a statute permits criminal, civil and
administrative punishment for an overbroad category of
innocuous actions, such a statute must also take into account the
specific, rather than general, intent of the actor, or the ensnaring
of innocents is ultimately likely to result. Historically, the statute
required a finding of specific intent to be found to uphold a
violation of the statute. With the passing of Greber v. US and the
Federal Anti-kickback statute’s amendment by the PPACA to
encompass almost any act not enumerated as a safe harbor,
prosecutors have been given remarkable power to decide when
and who to prosecute, and almost anyone participating in the
health care marketplace may find their self at risk of violating the
law. Prosecutors have also been given the remarkable power to
decide what constitutes genuine patient protection as we enter
into a new chapter of American health care.

*

Managing Editor, University of Miami Business Law Review, Volume 25; Juris
Doctor Candidate 2017, University of Miami School of Law. Bachelor of Science in
Journalism with an Outside Concentration 2014, University of Florida. I would like to
thank my Health Law Fundamentals I Professor, Jodi Laurence, for inspiring me to write
about the dangers of the over breadth of legal doctrine in one of the nation’s largest business
sectors. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Andre and Vanessa Dawson, who have
continually encouraged me to never stop fighting for what I believe in and constantly
reminding me of what I am capable of when I work hard.

195

196

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:195

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 196
II. STRUGGLING WITH THE TRANSLATION OF REFERRAL
REMUNERATIONS ........................................................................... 197
A. The Federal Government’s Fight to Kick Back Against
Health Care Fraud................................................................... 197
B. What Is Fraud and What Is Fair in the New Era of
Affordable Health Care? ......................................................... 201
III. THE THREATENING LEGAL IMPACT OF FEDERAL HEALTH CARE
FRAUD: PROSECUTORS’ FAVORITE TOOL ON COMBATING
FRAUD............................................................................................ 203
A. Where Is the Patient Protection? .............................................. 203
B. The Current Costs of Making Health Care Affordable for All .. 204
V. THE DAMAGED AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: HOW ARE
WE GOING TO FIX IT? .................................................................... 206
A. The Patient Protection Focus Requires Patient Protecting
Notice ....................................................................................... 206
B. Outlining the Impacts of Health Care Fraud on Patient
Medical History Records ......................................................... 208
C. Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: Variations in
Sentencing Between Specific Intent and General Intent
Violators .................................................................................. 209
D. A Call For One Final Amendment: Preserving the Good
SEEDS For Flourishing While Eliminating the Bad Seeds ..... 215
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 216

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine suffering from a debilitating disease for decades before
finally finding a physician or health care specialist able to meet your
medical needs to your personal level of satisfaction. Then, imagine
traveling to that medical care provider’s office for your next appointment
only to find it completely vacant with a padlocked front door. After calling
the office several times attempting to understand and make sense of the
situation, the phone never stops ringing. In fact, the voice mailbox has
been turned off, and you, the sick and vulnerable patient, are left without
answers. On the news later that night, a story breaks that your physician
was arrested for allegedly committing health care fraud.
In the latest era of American health care under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (hereinafter “PPACA” or “the Act”), combating
health care fraud has been an extremely high priority of the federal
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government1, which has caused many patients to face the predicament
described above. One of the federal government’s most powerful weapons
in combatting health care fraud and abuse has been the federal antikickback statute2 (hereinafter “the Statute”) as amended by the PPACA3.
This comment will discuss how one immensely powerful, constantly
amended, and overly broad statute possesses the ability to frustrate major
purposes of the PPACA in the health care marketplace. Part II of this
comment summarizes and explains the historical development of the
federal anti-kickback statute and the impact that the Statute has on
frustrating major end-goals of the PPACA, which call for the Statute’s
amendment. Part III of this comment will discuss the Statute’s ability to
set the national tone concerning what constitutes acceptable patient
protection practices and acceptable methods by which the government
may achieve affordable health care in the American health care
marketplace. Part IV addresses potential methods by which the federal
government may restrict the federal anti-kickback statute’s power to
frustrate major purposes of the PPACA, while simultaneously allowing
the Statute to aid law enforcement in the fight against health care fraud.

II. STRUGGLING WITH THE TRANSLATION OF REFERRAL
REMUNERATIONS
A. The Federal Government’s Fight to Kick Back Against Health
Care Fraud
Understanding the current impact of the federal anti-kickback statute
on the government’s ability to combat health care fraud under the PPACA
requires an understanding of the historical development of the Statute as
well as the PPACA’s purpose, and how the Act changed the Statute. The
federal anti-kickback statute was enacted under the Social Security
Amendments of 1972 as a misdemeanor criminal statute.4 When enacted,
the primary concern of the government was “outlawing health care

1
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f)(2),
124 Stat. 119, 759 (2010).
2
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2006); see also 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952. (2010).
3
See § 1320a-7b; see also § 1001.952.
4
See Shannon Barnet, 20 things to know about the Anti-Kickback Statute, BECKER’S
HOSPITAL REVIEW (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-regulator
y-issues/20-things-to-know-about-the-anti-kickback-statute.html; see also State v. Harden,
938 So.2d 480, 486-90 (2006) (citing Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92–603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972)).
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referrals that were considered unethical or inappropriate.”5 The original
language of the Statute stated:
w]hoever furnishes items or services to an individual for
which payment is or may be made under this title6 and
who solicits, offers, or receives any: 1) kickback or bribe
in connection with furnishing of such items or services or
making or receipt of such payment; or 2) rebate of any fee
or charge for referring any such individual to another
person for furnishing of such items or services shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for 1 year or both.7
In 1977, as Medicare and Medicaid fraud continued to drive up the
costs of health care,8 Congress passed the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud
and Abuse Amendments.9 The 1977 amendments increased the severity of
the criminal penalty for a violation of the Statute from a misdemeanor to
a felony, punishable by up to five years of imprisonment and/or a fine of
$25,000,10 and broadened the existing language of the Statute in order to
promote deterrence.11 Instead of centrally focusing on kickbacks, rebates
and bribes as the original language of the Statute had,12 the language of the
1977 version of the Statute focused on remuneration generally, given
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind.13 The change
in the language of the Statute resulted from complaints by federal
prosecutors who were pursuing health care fraud cases and who had
complained to Congress that the previous language of the statute was
“unclear and needed clarification”14 to ensure successful prosecution.
5

See Harden, 938 So.2d at 488-90. (citing Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92–603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972)).
6
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2) (2006).
7
Harden, 938 So.2d at 488. (citing Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92–603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972)); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2); Social Security
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977).
8
Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977).
9
See Shannon Barnet, 20 things to know about the Anti-Kickback Statute, BECKER’S
HOSPITAL REVIEW (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-regulator
y-issues/20-things-to-know-about-the-anti-kickback-statute.html.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–603, § 242(b), 86 Stat.
1329, 1419 (1972).
13
See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977).
14
See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
988 (1985) (citing H. Rep. No. 393, Part II, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. 53, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3039, 3055).
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Although the Statute had always imposed criminal liability, the Statute
did not require a finding of criminal intent until it was amended in 1980.15
As amended, the Statute required the government to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that an individual or entity “knowingly and willfully”
violated the Statute before he, she or it could be convicted of violating the
Statute.16 Courts immediately struggled trying to interpret what actions
would constitute a knowing and willful violation of the statute and what
exactly constituted remuneration17. In 1985, the Supreme Court clarified
what degree of criminal conduct is required to successfully convict an
individual for violating the Statute.18 In Greber, the Court established the
“one purpose” test, holding that so long as one purpose of giving,
receiving, offering or soliciting any remuneration was to induce referrals
for services payable by a federal health care program, the anti-kickback
statute is violated, even if the remuneration was also intended for another
subject purpose.19 In short, any remuneration given or received where one
purpose of the remuneration was to induce referrals for health care items
or services payable in part or in full by a federal health care program
violated the Statute and subjected both the referee and the referrer to
criminal liability.20
Years later, “[t]he OIG was given authority to issue civil penalties in
addition to the already authorized criminal penalties . . . under The
Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987.”21
This meant that the overly broad, constantly changing, and complex
criminal Statute could lead to health care providers, and any other person
for that matter, being found both criminally and civilly liable for actions
that either party may not have been aware would be considered illegal
remunerations under the law.
While referrals historically play a large role in many professional
industries and the offering and soliciting of referrals were perfectly legal
practices in industries outside of the health care industry,22 referrals
became felonious criminal activity within the health care industry.23 And
still, health care providers had no definitive answers as to what exactly

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

See Barnet, supra note 4.
See id.
Id.
See Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985).
See id. at 72.
See Barnet, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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constituted giving or receiving remuneration for a referral given the broad
language of the Statute.24
In light of the broad scope of the Statute at the time, the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) was mandated under the Medicare and Medicaid
Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987 to create regulatory safe
harbors.25 The safe harbors were intended to provide health care providers
with protection from liability where their actions may have otherwise
earlier resulted in a violation of the Statute. Meeting every requirement of
a safe harbor would ensure an individual or entity could not be found in
violation of the Statute for a specific practice which completely complied
with an anti-kickback statute safe harbor, and would protect the individual
or entity against liability and future criminal prosecution.26 The OIG’s
initial set of proposed anti-kickback statute safe harbors was first
announced in 1993 and finalized in 1999.27
Because many individuals involved in the business of health care were
still confused by the anti-kickback statute and what practices constituted a
violation, the OIG continued to propose and enact a total of what are
currently 2528 safe harbors that are acceptable and would not violate the
Statute.29 The OIG, however, still had not clarified whether the
government had to prove general intent or specific intent to sustain a
conviction for a violation of the Statute in situations where a safe harbor
was not met.30
While issues sustaining convictions did not arise in cases where
defendants clearly intended to engage in gross conduct in violation of the
Statute and were well aware of the legal consequences of such conduct,
issues arose in situations where individuals alleged that they were
completely unaware that their actions violated the law and that their
payment practices constituted remuneration under the Statute. The federal
government saw the issue as one where a broad interpretation was
necessary:
Medicare, Medicaid and other government health care
programs depend on physicians and other health care
professionals to exercise independent judgment in the
best interests of patients. Although monetary and other
24

See Harden, 938 So.2d at 488-90.
See Pub. L. No. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (1987) § 3.
26
Id.
27
See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback
56 Fed. Reg. 35932 (July 29, 1991).
28 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2010).
29
See id. (explaining which payment practices do not constitute a violation of the federal
anti-kickback statute).
30
Id.
25
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incentives tied to referrals are commonly accepted and
legal in many businesses, such acts can corrupt the health
care industry and harm federal programs. When a
physician refers a patient to a provider because of some
financial self-interest, the physician is not necessarily
making the decision in the patient’s best interests. Unfair
competition results when honest providers must compete
with those who unlawfully pay to generate business. This
systematic corruption of federal health care programs
defrauds the public.31
The problem remained, though, that while the government’s overall
goal of curbing fraud was a desirable one, innocent health care providers
could become ensnared by the Statute’s overarching reach.32

B. What Is Fraud and What Is Fair in the New Era of Affordable
Health Care?
The PPACA, also known as the Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare,
was passed under President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010.33 In an
effort to reform the American health care system, the PPACA, for fraud
purposes, aimed to make health care affordable for all Americans,34 to
improve “the quality and efficiency of health care,”35 and to eliminate the
impact of fraudulent, abusive and wasteful health care practices of
providers on the high costs of health care.36 But how would the
government eliminate the impact of fraud on the high costs of health care?
To realize the end goals of the PPACA, the federal anti-kickback statute,
now entitled “Criminal Penalties for acts involving federal health care
programs” under the PPACA, was amended “to provide that claims
submitted in violation of the [S]tatute automatically constitute false claims

31
Scott Oswald, Esq., and David Scher, Esq., Health care law expands False Claims
Act liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute, EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP, 3-4, (last visited
Jan 2, 2016 10:30 AM), https://www.employmentlawgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/Anti
Kickback-Statute-False-Claims-Lawyers.pdf.
32
Scott Oswald Esq., and David Scher, Esq., Health care law expands False Claims Act
liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute, Employment Law Group, 3-4 (last visited Jan. 2,
2016, 10:30 AM), http://www.employmentlawgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/AntiKickb
ack-Statute-False-Claims-Lawyers.pdf.
33
See id.
34
Affordable Health Care for America, THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, AND EDUC. AND LABOR (Jan. 4, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://housedoc
s.house.gov/energycommerce/SUMMARY.pdf
35
Id. at 2-3.
36
Id.
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for purposes of the False Claims Act.”37 Congress also added a new section
that eliminates the requirement that a person have actual knowledge of the
law or specific intent to commit a violation of the statute.38 Because of
these two significant changes, health care providers and other individuals
who had no knowledge of the Statute can no longer argue that they lacked
the intent to “knowingly and willfully” violate the Statute as a defense to
criminal and civil liability under both the Statute and the False Claims
Act.39 Notable is the fact that there are separate, severe penalties for every
violation of both the Statute and the False Claims Act.40 As the Statute
currently exists, a single violation, including the filing of a single false
claim for medical items or services paid in part or in full by a federal health
care program, constitutes a felony punishable by a fine of up to $25,000
and/or up to five years of imprisonment.41 In addition to the criminal
penalties, anyone involved in the business of health care who is convicted
under the Statute as it currently exists is also subject to civil monetary
penalties,42 to potential exclusion from the Medicare and/or Medicaid
programs, and to administrative penalties.43
Despite the Statute’s broad definition of remuneration and elimination
of its specific intent requirement, the long-term impact that the federal
anti-kickback statute may have on the PPACA actually being able to
ensure patient protection and make health care affordable remains
unanswered. Moreover, the meaning of “knowingly and willfully”44
exchanging remuneration can encompass behaviors so innocuous that
even courts have issues discerning when and why the Statute has been
violated.45 When the courts are unsure whether an individual’s actions
constitute a violation of the Statute, it seems commonsensical that a lay
juror or potential violator would find it difficult to determine what actions
constitute a violation as well. As such, the overly broad Statute has
essentially been broadened even further by the PPACA, allowing the
government, as well as private individuals bringing claims under the False
Claims Act, the discretion to go after the deepest pockets in the health care
business, both criminally and civilly.46

37

Oswald & Scher, supra note 31 at 3.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).
42 See Id.
43
Id.
44
See id.
45
See Harden, 938 So.2d at 487-89.
46
See, e.g., Heather Stauffer, Lancaster County hospital among many that will pay to
settle false billing allegations, LANCASTER ONLINE (Dec 20, 2015, 1:06 PM), http://lancas
38
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III. THE THREATENING LEGAL IMPACT OF FEDERAL HEALTH CARE
FRAUD: PROSECUTORS’ FAVORITE TOOL ON COMBATING FRAUD
The government’s ability to choose between prosecuting or
monetarily settling with health care providers and entities who violate the
Statute calls into question how important patient protection actually is to
the federal government when allegedly fraudulent, wealthy providers are
able to bypass criminal prosecution and felony convictions by reaching
monetary settlements with the government.47 The government’s
philosophy seems simple. When health care entities and individuals
choose to settle in lieu of prosecution, a large portion of the settlement
funds are funneled back into federal health care programs in order to
increase the funds available to Medicare and Medicaid patients and make
health care more affordable.48 Simultaneously, the government is given
the broad discretion to choose which medical providers (many of whom
may or may not be aware they have committed crimes) it will and will not
pursue. The government’s ability to arbitrarily pick and choose which
wealthy providers who violate the Statute will pay the costs to make
American health care more “affordable” also calls into question what
methods Americans are willing to find as acceptable means of funding a
health care system for all.

A. Where Is the Patient Protection?
The government’s reliance on the powerful federal anti-kickback
statute as amended under the PPACA poses several issues that may impact
the ability of the PPACA to achieve its goal of greater patient protection.
The potent impact of the Statute as it currently exists calls for its
amendment yet again given its potential impact on the future of patient
protection in the American health care system. First, the Statute allows for
the immediate arrest and future criminal prosecution of individuals and
entities involved in the business of health care; yet the PPACA provides
no guidelines for patients as to how they should respond in instances when
their medical care providers are either imprisoned or incarcerated. Second,
the PPACA also provides no guidelines on how other medical care
providers should view the validity of incoming patients’ medical history
and records documented by health care providers who have been convicted
under the Statute. Third, the PPACA provides no means or methods by
teronline.com/news/local/lancaster-county-hospital-among-many-that-will-pay-tosettle/article_b39b0b26-a5ac-11e5-8a43-63c3febc16f2.html.
47
Id.
48
See Affordable Health Care for America, THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, AND EDUC. AND LABOR (Jan. 4, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://housedo
cs.house.gov/energycommerce/SUMMARY.pdf
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which patients whose health care providers are convicted under the Statute
can obtain their past medical records once the providers are convicted and
incarcerated. Further, the PPACA does not require health care providers
who have been indicted, accused, or are awaiting trial for violating the
Statute to disclose those facts to their existing or past patients. Without
notice, patients may not be aware that they may need to start searching for
an affordable, competent health care provider until they learn of their
potentially fraudulent provider’s conviction. Despite these problems, the
federal anti-kickback statute has been one of the most powerful and
frequently used tools of law enforcement in the fight against health care
fraud—another goal of the PPACA. Consequently, while the Statute does
have the power to combat health care fraud and eliminate fraudulent
providers,49 it also has the potential to decrease patient protection. This is
the harsh reality that exists on the opposite end of the patient-protection
spectrum, and these are the reasons the Statute must be amended yet again
to better ensure the patient protection purpose of the PPACA is not
frustrated.

B. The Current Costs of Making Health Care Affordable for All
Not only does the government’s reliance on the Statute and the
Statute’s broad applicability to the business of health care frustrate the end
goal of patient protection, but its reliance also may frustrate the objective
of making health care affordable through the best potential means. Given
its overly broad nature and absence of actual knowledge or specific intent
requirement for an individual or entity to be convicted for its violation,50
the government has wide latitude when choosing against whom the Statute
will be enforced. Since even the most innocuous of business arrangements,
including business arrangements perfectly legal in other business
industries, may violate the Statute,51 the government can theoretically
choose to target certain groups of health care providers and arbitrarily
enforce the law.
The government also has the ability to drop criminal charges and
pursue False Claims Act civil litigation against entities with deeper
pockets, and to use the Statute’s criminal penalties as leverage to
incentivize individuals and entities in the health care business to settle and
avoid jail time. Notably, the government has a significantly lower burden
49
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f)(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
50
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).
51
See, e.g., Lisa A. Estrada, Physicians Face Increased Anti-Kickback Enforcement
Focus, HEALTH CARE LAW TODAY (June 23, 2015), https://www.healthcarelawtoday.com/
2015/06/23/physicians-face-increased-anti-kickback-enforcement-focus/.
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in a civil case as opposed to a criminal case, which disadvantages the
accused.52 Threatened into choosing between fighting a felony criminal
prosecution, which can carry immense legal fees and up to five years of
imprisonment per violation, or settling with the federal government for
millions of dollars civilly, some providers may feel the latter is the most
affordable and least risky of the two alternatives—even when they do not
admit guilt and honestly believed that they were complying with the law.53
Thus, innocent health care providers may end up settling for millions of
dollars not only to avoid crushing attorney’s fees, but also because they
feel it is their best alternative to potential imprisonment.54 The Statute thus
creeps into the innocuous business practices of innocent individuals and
leads them to turn over their hard-earned funds in order to fund the
Medicare and Medicaid health care programs.
Undoubtedly, there are cases so egregiously unethical and deplorable
that they should result in the accused forfeiting illegally received funds to
federal health care programs as reimbursement.55 In those cases, the
government should be able to capitalize on the power of the federal antikickback statute and restore illegally obtained funds to federal health care
programs and impose severe terms of imprisonment.56 But, funding federal
health care programs by taking away the hard-earned money of some of
our nation’s brightest, life-saving, and potentially innocent health care
providers is an unacceptable means of making health care affordable for
all Americans.
When innocent Americans can become entangled in innocuous
situations that threaten penalties and punishments as severe as those
imposed under the current version of the federal anti-kickback statute, it is
completely natural for said individuals not to have alarm bells going off in
their heads given that they are supposed to be the patients the government
aims to protect under the PPACA. In fact, they shouldn’t have alarm bells
going off in their heads. The alarm bells should be going off in the heads
of our elected legislators, alerting them to existing problems with the
Statute as it currently exists post-PPACA amendments, and causing them
to realize that the Statute needs to be amended to ensure patient protection
while making health care affordable, rather than increasing patient
frustration and making health care affordable by unscrupulous means.
52

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).
See, e.g., Stauffer, supra note 46.
54
Id.
55
See, e.g., Detroit Area Doctor Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison for Providing
Medically Unnecessary Chemotherapy to Patients (2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
detroit-area-doctor-sentenced-45-years-prison-providing-medically-unnecessarychemotherapy (last updated July 10, 2015).
56
Id.
53
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Though innocent health care providers may not always be the targets
of criminal charges following a violation of the Statute, the position in
which these providers find themselves gives prosecutors the arbitrary
latitude to threaten them with prosecution in exchange for testimony
against individuals who are not innocent or blatantly guilty. The broad
language of the Statute also gives prosecutors discretion to go after certain
health care providers and agencies. As a result, making large amounts of
money may no longer be the goal of many providers, and the quality of
care they provide may also no longer be as important when they are forced
by the government to provide services to more individuals at a lower cost
or face punishment.

V. THE DAMAGED AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: HOW ARE
WE GOING TO FIX IT?
To allow the PPACA’s major purposes to be realized and to
reasonably decrease U.S.C. § 1320(A)-7(B)’S ability to have such
controlling weight over the future of the American health care system,
several approaches are available to the government to curtail the Statute’s
power by amendment.

A. The Patient Protection Focus Requires Patient Protecting
Notice
As U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) and the PPACA are currently drafted, no
provision of either law provides for a notice requirement for victims of
health care fraud.57 Therefore, there are no requirements that an individual
such as the person identified in the opening hypothetical be made aware
when their health care providers have been arrested for, or convicted of,
violating U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b). The absence of a notice provision for
health care fraud victims in these situations leaves patients unprotected
when they are most vulnerable, and that circumstance may result from one
simple unintended violation of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b).58 One way to ensure
that patient protection is realized under the PPACA is for Congress to
amend the PPACA to require that health care providers provide notice to
their previous and existing patients when they have been arrested or
convicted of health care fraud.
One way of understanding the necessity of a notice requirement can
be demonstrated through health care fraud cases involving physical risk to
57

See 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) (2012); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f)(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
58
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) (2012).

2016-2017] ELECTING NOT TO AMEND 42 USC § 1320(A)-7(B)

207

patients.59 In some instances of fraud which violate U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b),
health care providers have subjected patients to medical procedures that
can be dangerous, unnecessary, and oftentimes, deadly.60 The National
Health Care Anti-Fraud Association demonstrated the necessity of
providing notice to patients when they have been victims of fraud through
the following case:
In June 2002, . . . a Chicago cardiologist was sentenced to
12-1/2 years in federal prison and was ordered to pay
$16.5 million in fines and restitution after pleading guilty
to performing 750 medically unnecessary heart
catheterizations, along with unnecessary angioplasties
and other tests as part of a 10-year fraud scheme. Three
other physicians and a hospital administrator also pleaded
guilty and received prison sentences for their part in the
scheme, which resulted in the deaths of at least two
patients . . . .The physicians and hospital induced
hundreds of homeless persons, substance abusers, and
elderly men and women to feign symptoms and be
admitted to the hospital for the unnecessary procedures.
How? By offering them incentives such as food, cash and
cigarettes. ‘There were 750 people who had needles stuck
into their hearts purely for profit, not because they needed
it,’ said one of the federal prosecutors.61 (quotations
removed)
Given that many of the patients in this case were homeless individuals,
many of them may never have been informed that the procedures they
endured had potentially deadly side effects and were essentially performed
for profit.
Patients faced with cases of egregious health care fraud, such as the
vulnerable victims in this Chicago case, deserve to be provided with
answers. They deserve to be provided with notice of their rights, and they
deserve to be provided with guidelines as to what steps they may take to
ensure their current and future personal health and safety, as well as to
ensure justice. Therefore, Congress should amend the PPACA to provide
a notice provision for patients who are victims of fraudulent health care
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providers, as well as provisions outlining any necessary or appropriate
steps victims may take in these instances.

B. Outlining the Impacts of Health Care Fraud on Patient Medical
History Records
False billing and overbilling are two major ways by which health care
fraud takes place in the American health care system.62 In some health care
fraud schemes, this takes place in the form of health care providers
deliberately misdiagnosing patients and performing procedures that could
potentially remain in their patients’ medical histories for the rest of their
lives.63 Though U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) in connection with the PPACA
provides for available punishments against fraudulent providers in these
instances, the PPACA neglects to take into account the validity and
reliability of the medical histories of patients who have been the victims
of fraudulent providers.64 This may lead to patients feeling unprotected
and unsure of the reliability and validity of their medical records and
histories, as well as necessary doctor’s visits to validate or verify their
health statuses after they’ve become aware that they may be a victim of
health care fraud.
Fraudulent providers can also create severe problems for individuals
by creating false records despite never having provided care. Examples of
these lingering injustices for victims of health care fraud have been shown
by the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association in a Consumer Alert
about the impact of health care fraud on patients.65 The Consumer Alert
provided the following real-life case:
A Boston-area psychiatrist . . . forfeited $1.3 million and
was sentenced to several years in federal prison following
his late-1990s conviction on 136 counts of mail fraud,
money laundering and witness intimidation related to his
fraudulent billing of several health insurers for psychiatric
therapy sessions that never took place-using the names
and insurance information of many people whom he
actually had never met, let alone treated. (He also went so
far as to write fictitious longhand session notes to ensure
phony backup for his phony claims.) . . . In fabricating the
claims, the psychiatrist also fabricated diagnoses for those
62
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“patients”-many of them adolescents. The phony
conditions he assigned to them included ‘depressive
psychosis,’ ‘suicidal ideation,’ ‘sexual identity problems’
and ‘behavioral problems in school.’66
Notably, both U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) and the PPACA also neglect to
outline and describe how much credit and/or weight a patient’s future
health care providers should give to the medical records and histories of
patients who are victims of fraudulent health care providers.
Since U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) is broad enough to hold providers
accountable for an endless list of technically, though not willfully,
fraudulent practices, and broad enough to create victims out of those
providers’ patients, more patients may also be at risk of their health care
providers being accused or convicted of fraud. Congress can better ensure
patient protection and alleviate this issue (which is clearly an undesirable
potential impact of the PPACA) by amending the PPACA to outline how
medical fraud victims’ medical records and histories should be viewed by
their future health care providers, and by providing guidelines for victims
of fraud to follow should they find themselves in such a predicament.

C. Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: Variations in Sentencing
Between Specific Intent and General Intent Violators
Undoubtedly, health care fraud is an issue of national concern.
Considering the health care industry is one of the largest and fastest
growing in America,67 it is no surprise that individuals specifically target
the health care industry with the intent to commit fraud.68 However, given
the broad language of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b), it is possible that many
innocent individuals and entities entering the industry may take actions in
violation of the Statute completely unaware that their practices may be
considered illegal and that they may be subject to felony prosecution.69 In
those instances, courts have historically found that ignorance of the law is
66
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no excuse. This strict enforcement view can be understood given the
devastating impact health care fraud has had on the American economy
over the years, as well as by examining some of the most egregious cases.70
In FY 2014, the federal government recovered $1.9 billion more in
fraudulently obtained health care funds than it had in FY 2013.71 The year
2014 saw the recovery of $5.7 billion in fraudulently obtained health care
dollars,72 which if unrecovered, would drive up the costs of health care for
all Americans. The severity of punishment for a single violation of the
statute makes sense in terms of cracking down on fraudulent providers.73
Since 2007, the government has charged over 2,300 accused health care
fraudsters with collectively billing Medicare and/or Medicaid for over $7
billion in fraudulent claims.74 The need for the government to be able to
effectively fight health care fraud to ensure patient protection and
affordable care for all, as well as law enforcement’s eagerness to rely on
the Statute to combat fraud can be easily understood in light of some of
the largest health care fraud cases of 2015.
In Michigan, a state where health care fraud has been a serious
problem, Dr. Farid Fata, M.D. pleaded guilty not only to conspiring to pay
kickbacks, but also to conspiring to receive kickbacks.75 Chief Richard
Weber, of the Internal Revenue Service, called the case of Dr. Fata “the
most egregious case of fraud and deception” that he’d seen in his entire
career.76 According to the Department of Justice, Dr. Fata was a licensed
medical doctor who owned and operated a cancer treatment center through
which he admitted to “prescribing and administering unnecessary
aggressive chemotherapy, canter treatments . . . and other infusion
therapies to patients in order to increase his billings to Medicare and other
health insurance companies.”77 Chief Richard Weber perfectly summed up
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the needs for better patient protection overall and for the government to
recover illegally obtained funds as demonstrated by Dr. Fata’s case:
Dr. Fata not only defrauded the government out of
millions of dollars, but he lied to his patients about their
health and intentionally put their lives at risk. In fact,
because of his lies, some of those patients who he was
entrusted to care for likely died as a result of his
actions. This defendant greedily cared more about his
own financial well-being than the lives of his
patients. This disgusting and diabolical scheme has hurt
hundreds of patients and their families and stolen from
them something that no punishment from the court can do
to make them whole.78
Unfortunately, specific intent-based violations of health care fraud laws
such as Dr. Fata’s are not at all uncommon; especially in South Florida,
where some of the largest health care fraud schemes have taken place.
In August 2015, a formal medical director and three therapists were
convicted in a health care fraud scheme where a total of 22 defendants
were charged after the now defunct mental health care center they
allegedly worked for submitted79 “approximately $63.7 million in false
and fraudulent claims (also considered kickbacks) to Medicare, and
received payments” amounting in around $28 million paid out by
Medicare for claims of services that in some instances were never even
provided.80 In addition to paying kickbacks to assisted living facility
owners and operators in Miami for Medicare patient referrals, health care
providers at the mental health clinic also fabricated medical records “to
support false and fraudulent claims for partial hospitalization program
services that were not medically necessary and often never provided.81
“Notably, in that case, the victims were elderly mental health patients
suffering from Alzheimer’s and dementia who were unaware of any
existing scheme and the fact that they were actually being defrauded.82
Here, the need for patient protection was undeniable. In the Government’s
Consolidated Sentencing Memorandum in the case, Allan Medina, trial
attorney, United States Department of Justice Criminal Division, Fraud
78
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Section, explained why the egregious conduct of the defendants called for
serious patient protection:
[T]he fraud at Health Care Solutions Network, Inc.
(“HCSN”) victimized Medicare and Medicaid and the
very patients the Defendants and their co-conspirators
purported to help. For years – not days, weeks, or months
– the Defendants took advantage of some of society’s
most vulnerable people – individuals suffering from
dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, mental retardation and
other debilitating psychiatric conditions, as well as
individuals that may have desperately needed, but never
received, legitimate PHP treatment. HSCN was a criminal
enterprise built on lies and deceit, and these Defendants
played a vital role in its assembly line of fraud83 . . .
Without a doubt, the fraud at HCSN would not have
flourished without Rousseau, as he was HCSN’s Medical
Director from day one. For more than six years, he blindly
signed HCSN medical records and recruited others to fuel
the fraud, including other doctors—Dr. Villamil and Dr.
Manley—and an intake assessment specialist from a
hospital in South Florida—Francisco Pabon—who agreed
to sell patients to HCSN in exchange for cash payments
and gift cards. Patients who may have needed medical
attention were beside the point; the patients at HCSN were
commodities, and Rousseau allowed unlicensed
professionals, such as Dana Gonzalez, to play doctor in
his stead.84
As egregious as these cases may undoubtedly be, the majority of
serious health care fraud is committed by a minute fraction of moneyhungry health care providers consciously acting both knowingly and
willfully with the specific intent to defraud the government for their own
personal gain.85 However, not all violations of health care fraud are so
egregious. In the cases of general intent violators, the dominating use and
effect of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b), which essentially forces health care
professionals to settle with the federal government for millions of dollars
though they may have not knowingly and willfully violated the law, calls
into question how much power the federal government should have over
the health care industry under a single statute.
83
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In a recent case, more than 130 hospitals agreed to a settlement with
the federal government which will cause them to pay more than $105
million to resolve allegations that the hospitals submitted Medicare claims
for medically unnecessary procedures,86 each of which was technically a
separate and distinct violation of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b). A spokeswoman
for one of the hospitals said in a statement that “[e]ven though there were
no findings of wrongdoing or liability, we agreed to the settlement to avoid
the delay, uncertainty, inconvenience and expense of protracted litigation
in a case that has been pending since 2008,”87 raising the troubling
possibility that the hospital settled because settlement was the safest
solution, and not because the hospital intended to break the law.
In another recent case which alleged fraudulent hospital medical
practices in 43 of the 50 states, a record-breaking 457 hospitals reached a
$250 million settlement with the federal government.88 In that case, the
Department of Justice alleged that the hospitals performed procedures
placing implantable cardioverter defibrillators in patients too soon after
bypass surgery, angioplasty or heart attacks.89 In cases like this, the
question arises of whether a medical service provider should be punished
for making the decision to perform procedures he or she may honestly
believe are in the best interest of his or her patients merely because the
government disagrees about the medical necessity of said procedures.
Essentially, every single procedure where a health care provider
implanted a cardioverter defibrillator in a Medicare or Medicaid patient
when the health care professional truly believed the procedure was
medically necessary and billed Medicare for that procedure constituted a
violation of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b), and subjected that health care provider
to potential felony charges.90 In this case, as in many others, the accused
hospitals involved did not accept liability by the terms of the settlement,
and many officials for the hospitals “maintain they gave their patients
proper medical care but settled allegations to avoid further litigation.”91 A
spokeswoman for another hospital which is also tied to the University of
Maryland stated, “While the government’s focus was on the billing
criteria, our primary focus has always been to ensure that our patients are
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provided with appropriate care, and we are satisfied that appropriate care
was, in fact, provided to our patients.”92
Under The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ rules,
defibrillators of the type at issue here “can only be implanted 40 days after
a heart attack and 90 days after bypass surgery or angioplasty. The rules
are designed to give patients’ heart function time to improve, possibly
negating the need for a defibrillator, and were developed based on clinical
trials and input from specialists, manufacturers and patient advocates.”93
However, the rules do not take into account what rights health care
professionals have in times of emergency, nor what rights they have when
their opinions of what procedures are medically necessary conflict with
Medicare’s rules. In these instances, health care professionals are forced
to choose between what they truly believe is right for their patient and
doing only what is considered medically necessary and covered by their
patients’ insurance.94 In the words of Dr. Alan Cheng, a cardiologist and
associate professor of medicine at the Johns Hopkins University School of
Medicine, who was not involved in the settlement:
[T]here are times when it doesn’t make sense to wait, such
as when a patient’s heart function is so poor he’s
scheduled for a defibrillator implant but has a heart attack
before surgery. Other times a patient has a heart attack
and function isn’t likely to improve, and doctors want to
implant both a pacemaker and a defibrillator immediately.
In that case, the patient would have to have two
procedures to comply with the defibrillator rule.95
As evidenced by these cases, in some instances, health care
professional violators truly believe they are innocent, and the Statute as it
currently exists does not require the government to prove actual
knowledge or specific intent to sustain a conviction. Still, their actions are
technically in violation of the law and subject them to felony punishments.
To rectify the controlling power of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b)’s in these
instances of general intent-based violations, Congress must amend the
Statute’s provisions to provide for a differentiation between general and
specific intent-based violations in terms of the severity of punishment and
penalties available for violators of the law. Doing so would allow the
government the ability to continue successfully prosecuting all violators
of the Statute while recovering fraudulent funds and making health care
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more affordable. For the less culpable offenders, this legislative action
would allow them to avoid the severity of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b)’s
potential wrath where there is no specific intent to defraud, and for the
specific-intent violators, justice may rightly be served. Variations in
punishments between specific and general intent violators can be made in
the classification of their offenses as misdemeanors or felonies as well as
in the severity of civil penalties available for the government to pursue.

D. A Call For One Final Amendment: Preserving the Good SEEDS
For Flourishing While Eliminating the Bad Seeds
While one possibility is to amend U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b)’s provisions
allowing for a differentiation in the severity of penalties available for
general and specific intent violations, perhaps the better solution would be
to make any violation of the Statute a specific intent-based crime. The
government would most likely argue that the government needs to be able
to effectively enforce the law, and specific intent-based crimes are harder
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt than are general intent-based crimes.
Perhaps it should be harder for law enforcement to prove that our nation’s
brightest individuals who have dedicated their lives to improving the
American health care system are genuine criminals, given the message that
that actuality would send to future generations of health care patients about
the amount of protection they can expect as health care patients and about
the trustworthiness of their health care professionals.
If deterrence and the elimination of fraudulent providers are the goals
of our government, why punish those individuals or entities who
unknowingly violated the law when they’ve dedicated their entire lives to
patient protection and treatment? Shouldn’t actual knowledge be a prerequisite to find guilt in these cases? In theory, deterrence involves
punishing criminals so that future potential criminals are discouraged from
committing the same wrongful and illegal acts. But when the alleged
criminals were not even aware their actions were wrongful, U.S.C.
§ 1320(a)-7(b) should not be able to destroy their reputations in the
medical community forever. The patient protection focus of the PPACA
is frustrated when those who devote their lives to protecting patients –our
nation’s best and brightest health care providers—can face felony criminal
charges for doing just that: protecting their patients.
If the government aims to eliminate fraudulent providers, it should do
just that. As noted in the cases of Dr. Fata and the mental health care
professionals in Miami, specific intent to violate the Statute can be proven,
and exposing those who specifically intend to defraud and eliminating
them from our health care industry does ensure better patient protection in
the future and does restore Medicare funds, making health care more
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affordable. However, those health care providers who are potentially
innocent or engage in conduct that only constitutes a violation of U.S.C.
§ 1320(a)-7(b) because of the Statute’s over-broadness, should not be
viewed in the same light nor legally treated in the same way as the clearly
money hungry, fraudulent providers. Instead, they should be respected
based on their merits and achievements in the field of medicine. They
should be celebrated as well as appreciated for the hard work they do. They
should be able to make determinations of what the best decisions are
concerning medical treatments for their patients. And, they should be able
to perform these actions without the fear of being criminally prosecuted,
facing jail time, and facing endless attorney’s fees for violating an overly
broad statute in the name of protecting their patients. For these reasons,
society would benefit far greater from making U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) a
specific-intent-based statute despite the fact that the government would
undoubtedly recover more Medicare funds by not requiring specific intent
nor actual knowledge to sustain a felony conviction under U.S.C.
§ 1320(a)-7(b).
The majority of health care fraud is intentionally committed by a
minority of bad seeds.96 Inevitably, one bad seed can tremendously
frustrate the ability for a garden to grow by the right means. Removing
these bad seeds from our American Health Care System Garden and
disallowing them the ability to devastate our Garden is of benefit to all
Americans. But in order for our Garden to flourish, we need our
metaphorical good seeds to continue working for the right reasons and to
continue being encouraged to provide the best patient protection that they
can. To realize patient protection and help make health care affordable for
all Americans as envisioned under the PPACA, we as a nation need to call
to our Congress’ attention the potential effects of this overly broad Statute
on the ability of our good seeds to flourish. Otherwise, uncertainty exists
as to which direction our Garden may grow. The best way to achieve this
reality is by making a violation of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) one that requires
a finding of specific-intent.

VI. CONCLUSION
There are several ways by which Congress can amend the current
federal anti-kickback statute to better ensure patient protection under the
PPACA and make health care affordable by means more reasonable for
all. Some of the ways by which this can occur are by including guidelines
in the PPACA which will provide victims of health care fraud with
guidance of what steps to take and what rights they have when their health
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care providers are accused of, charged with, or convicted of health care
fraud; providing a notice requirement in the PPACA which requires health
care providers to provide notice and the availability of potential rights to
their current and past patients when charged with or convicted of violating
health care fraud laws; allowing for a differentiation in the degree and/or
level of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) violations in instances of general intent
versus specific intent; or, making a violation of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) a
specific-intent based crime requiring a showing of actual knowledge
before guilt can be found.
Whether Congress is actually willing to amend U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b)
to take into account its effect on the practicability of the PPACA may not
only impact the future public opinion concerning the trustworthiness of
American health care providers, but it also may frustrate key reasons of
why the PPACA was enacted in the first place. Patient protection and
affordable care will always come at a cost. But a large percentage of that
cost should be paid by the bad seeds, while the good seeds are left to grow
not only their professional medical practices, but also left a stronger,
healthier American nation.

